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I. INTRODUCTIONMODERN elections engender a multitude of challenging consti-
tutional issues due to the complex entanglement of interests
possessed by individuals running for office, public employees
subject to the control of elected officials, and voters who determine the
election's outcome and benefit from the public office assumed by the pre-
vailing candidate. The difficulties associated with these interests are exac-
erbated when a governmental employee decides to run for an elected
office, particularly an elected position within the government body in
which he is employed. On one hand, the public employee may be particu-
larly well-qualified to assume the position. He has experience working
within the department and knows more intimately the department's effi-
ciencies and ineptitudes. On the other hand, his candidacy could create
turmoil, strife, and uncertainty throughout the office in which he works.
If the public employee electorally challenges his superior, he simultane-
ously implies disapproval of that superior's job performance and stakes
claim to take over the position. If the incumbent elected official decides
not to run for another term, the public employee's political rivals may be
coworkers. Other employees within the department may feel involunta-
rily forced to choose sides; tensions may escalate, tempers may flare, and
before long the previously effective government body is inefficiently ful-
filling its obligations to the public. To avoid these adverse consequences,
elected officials may prefer to take retaliatory action against such politi-
cal opponents by dismissing or demoting them. In some instances, the
retaliation may justifiably protect legitimate government interests. But in
other instances, the employer simply hopes to protect his own political
prospects or exact a measure of revenge against his rival.
The First Amendment generally protects the rights of individuals, in-
cluding public employees, to engage in political speech or other political
activities.' In the absence of accompanying political speech, the contours
of the constitutional right to political candidacy remain indeterminate.2 In
its limited precedent pertaining to candidacy, the Supreme Court has only
considered state laws that hamper the opportunity of individuals to run
for office.3 In these decisions, the Court habitually invokes the Equal
Protection Clause while stressing the constitutional rights of voters rather
than the rights of candidates.4 Never has the Court heard a case alleging
an unconstitutional retaliation against a public employee on the basis of
candidacy. In contrast, jurisprudence governing the scope of First
Amendment protection for freedom of expression and association is well-
developed. A detailed methodology exists for determining when public
1. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 339-40 (2010); Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347,
356 (1976) (plurality opinion).
2. See discussion infra Part III.
3. See discussion infra Part II-A.
4. See discussion infra Part II-A.
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employees can be discharged for engaging in First Amendment protected
behavior, but the Court has not connected this framework to political
candidacy.5 Consequently, the circuits are badly split regarding the ex-
tent, if any, of constitutional protection for candidacy and utilize contra-
dictory methodologies when addressing retaliatory employment actions
against public employees for candidacy announcements. 6 One circuit rec-
ognizes protection for candidacy,7 two do not,8 and three protect candi-
dacy announcements as a form of expression.9
Part II of this Comment outlines the Supreme Court's jurisprudence
related to the scope of First Amendment protection for candidacy in the
context of "ballot access" restrictions on candidates as well as the meth-
odology for determining when the government can constitutionally retali-
ate against an employee for exercising First Amendment rights. Part III
describes the current circuit split with respect to protection for candidacy
under the First Amendment. Part IV-A offers an argument that the issues
involved in assessing the constitutionality of candidacy dismissals can be
distinguished from those relevant to the constitutionality of laws restrict-
ing candidacy. Consequently, reliance on Supreme Court opinions that
address candidacy restrictions is misplaced. Part IV-B contends that can-
didacy should be protected by the First Amendment in order to deriva-
tively protect political speech and activity that takes place over the course
of a political campaign. Part IV-C contemplates whether a candidacy an-
nouncement constitutes expression that touches on matters of public con-
cern. Part IV-D examines the policy ramifications attendant to
constitutional protection for candidacy. Finally, Part IV-E addresses the
methodology that should be applied when weighing the constitutional in-
terest in candidacy of a public employee against the government's interest
in his dismissal.
II. BACKGROUND
The First Amendment of the Constitution provides: "Congress shall
make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, . . . or the right of the
people peaceably to assemble."10 The First Amendment also constrains
the states by virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process
Clause." Though not expressly stated in the text of the Constitution, the
First Amendment implicitly guarantees freedom of association, which
functions as "an indispensable means" of shielding the Constitution's ex-
5. See discussion infra Part II-B.
6. See discussion infra Part III.
7. Randall v. Scott, 610 F.3d 701, 713 (11th Cir. 2010).
8. Carver v. Dennis, 104 F.3d 847, 853 (6th Cir. 1997); Newcomb v. Brennan, 558 F.2d
825, 828 (7th Cir. 1977).
9. Jantzen v. Hawkins, 188 F.3d 1247, 1257 (10th Cir. 1999); Click v. Copeland, 970
F.2d 106, 112 (5th Cir. 1992); Finkelstein v. Bergna, 924 F.2d 1449, 1453 (9th Cir. 1991).
10. U.S. CONsT. amend. I.
11. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer
Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 749 n.1 (1976).
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plicit First Amendment guarantees. 12 The First Amendment's guarantees
extend to an array of activities related to political campaigns, most nota-
bly the speech uttered by candidates.13 Additionally, the act of casting a
ballot in favor of a particular candidate constitutes an exercise of the
freedom of association.14 Accordingly, First Amendment rights of both
candidates and voters are exercised during a political campaign and cor-
responding election.' 5 When considering the constitutionality of laws that
restrict candidate access to ballots, the Supreme Court has often focused
on the rights of voters rather than candidates.16
Despite seemingly unconditional language, the guarantees of the First
Amendment are not absolute.' 7 When an individual accepts employment
from the government, his constitutionally guaranteed First Amendment
rights may conflict with his employer's need to carry out mandated func-
tions for the benefit of the public.' 8 Consequently, the government may
find cause to restrict or even eliminate the First Amendment rights of
public employees. Alternatively, the government may decide to demote,
dismiss, or otherwise punish employees for exercising their First Amend-
ment rights. Recognizing the importance of both individual and govern-
ment interests and the need to balance the two, the Supreme Court has
created multiple frameworks for determining when a government em-
ployer can constitutionally make a retaliatory employment decision
against an employee for exercising First Amendment rights.19
A. THE "BALLOT ACCESS" CASES
The Supreme Court has not considered the constitutionality of a public
employee's dismissal in retaliation for conducting a political campaign.
However, lower courts rely heavily on the "ballot access" cases when ex-
pounding the contours of protection for candidacy in the context of a
candidacy dismissal. 20 The ballot access cases concern state statutes that
restrict the ability of potential candidates to run for public office. 21 Most
of these cases have been decided under the Equal Protection Clause as
imposing an unconstitutionally discriminatory burden on the rights of vot-
ers, rather than on the rights of the candidates themselves. 22 Candidacy
restrictions burden voters' freedom of association under the First Amend-
12. Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 617-18 (1984).
13. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 339 (2010) ("The First Amendment has its
fullest and most urgent application to speech uttered during a campaign for political of-
fice." (quoting Eu v. S.F. Cnty. Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 223 (1989)) (inter-
nal quotation marks omitted)).
14. Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 787-88 (1983).
15. See id.
16. See discussion infra Part II-A.
17. Neb. Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 570 (1976).
18. See Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968).
19. See discussion infra Part II-B.
20. See discussion infra Part III.
21. See Clements v. Fashing, 457 U.S. 957, 959 (1982); Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134,
136-37 (1972); Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 24-26 (1968).
22. See, e.g., Bullock, 405 U.S. at 149.
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ment because restricting a candidate's access to the ballot imposes a con-
comitant impediment on the opportunity for voters to associate with that
candidate. 23 Because the right to vote "in a free and unimpaired manner
is preservative of other basic civil and political rights," voting is recog-
nized as a fundamental right under equal protection.24
The Due Process Clause and Equal Protection Clause within the Four-
teenth Amendment are closely related and can provide overlapping pro-
tection of individual rights. 25 Frequently, government action running
afoul of equal protection will also contravene due process.26 Neverthe-
less, the differences between the two must be carefully scrutinized in or-
der to appreciate the relationship between the ballot access cases, which
are typically resolved under equal protection, and the constitutionality of
candidacy dismissals, which must be decided under due process. 27 Due
process focuses on the fairness of interaction between the state and indi-
viduals whereas equal protection prevents the state from treating simi-
larly situated individuals differently.28 When a statute is challenged under
the Equal Protection Clause, courts will apply one of three standards of
review depending on the importance of the individual interests allegedly
impaired.29 If the statute discriminatorily impairs a "fundamental right,"
a strict scrutiny test is appropriate, requiring that the statute be narrowly
tailored to serve a compelling government interest through the least dis-
criminatory means available. 30 If the statute neither impairs a fundamen-
tal right nor involves a suspect class, courts apply a more deferential
intermediate scrutiny or rational basis standard of review.31
The first type of ballot access restriction involves limitations on the op-
portunities for small political parties or independent candidates to be in-
cluded on the ballot. In Williams v. Rhodes, the Supreme Court
invalidated an Ohio statute that placed substantial burdens on the ability
of new political parties to place candidates on ballots, "mak[ing] it virtu-
ally impossible for any party to qualify on the ballot except the Republi-
can and Democratic Parties." 32 The majority held that because the state
did not provide a sufficiently compelling interest as justification, the stat-
ute violated the Equal Protection Clause by discriminatorily infringing
upon minority parties' First Amendment right to freedom of association
and the right to vote as compared to more well-established parties.33
23. Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 787-88 (1983).
24. Harper v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 667 (1966).
25. 16B AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 830 (2012).
26. See Williams, 393 U.S. at 34 (invalidating candidacy restriction under equal protec-
tion); id. at 41 (Harlan, J., concurring) (arguing that candidacy restriction is invalid under
due process rather than equal protection).
27. See, e.g., Bullock 405 U.S. at 149.
28. Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 609 (1974).
29. 16B AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 857.
30. Id. The strict scrutiny test is also applied when a "suspect class" is disadvantaged
by the statute. Id.
31. Id.
32. 393 U.S. 23, 24-25, 34 (1968).
33. Id. at 31, 34.
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Concurring, Justice Harlan would have grounded the decision under the
First Amendment as applied through the Due Process Clause.3 4 Justice
Harlan argued that even though the Ohio statute did not directly restrict
political affiliation, it "eliminated the basic incentive" for political parties
"to assemble or discuss public issues or solicit new members." 35 There-
fore, the statute effectively deprived individuals "of the substance, if not
the form" of their right to political affiliation. 36
On the other hand, the Court has rejected First Amendment and Equal
Protection challenges to state statutes where the restrictive provisions are
outweighed by a compelling governmental interest.37 For instance, Texas
statutes restricting candidate access to the ballots were upheld when they
"in no way fr[oze] the status quo, but implicitly recognize[d] the potential
fluidity of American political life" while preserving a "real and essentially
equal opportunity for ballot qualification" by smaller political parties.38
The Court has also considered the constitutionality of state statutes
that compel candidates to pay filing fees in order to be included on the
ballot. In Bullock v. Carter, the Supreme Court invalidated a Texas statue
under equal protection that required candidates to pay filing fees up to
$8,900.39 In very important language, frequently cited by the circuits as
either support for or denial of constitutional protection of candidacy, the
Court stated:
The initial and direct impact of filing fees is felt by aspirants for of-
fice, rather than voters, and the Court has not heretofore attached
such fundamental status to candidacy as to invoke a rigorous stan-
dard of review. However, the rights of voters and the rights of candi-
dates do not lend themselves to neat separation; laws that affect
candidates always have at least some theoretical, correlative effect
on voters.40
Lower courts dispute whether this language merely rejects candidacy as
a fundamental right for purposes of requiring strict scrutiny under equal
protection or, alternatively, rejects candidacy as constitutionally pro-
tected by the First Amendment language.41 Ultimately, strict scrutiny was
still applicable because the system discriminatorily favored the voting in-
terests of the wealthy.42 The Court found no sufficiently compelling gov-
ernmental interest to justify the filing fees, particularly considering a
complete deficiency of any "reasonable alternative means of access to the
ballot." 4 3
34. Id. at 41 (Harlan, J., concurring).
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. See Am. Party of Tex. v. White, 415 U.S. 767, 780-81 (1974).
38. Id. at 787-88.
39. 405 U.S. 134, 145, 149 (1972).
40. Id. at 142-43.
41. See discussion infra Part III.
42. Bullock, 405 U.S. at 144.
43. Id. at 149.
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In a third variant of statutory candidacy restrictions, some states have
imposed "resign to run" requirements whereby elected officials occupy-
ing certain specified positions are restricted from running for another
elected position. In Clements v. Fashing, the Court upheld two provisions
of the Texas Constitution: the first prohibited elected judges from running
for the Texas Legislature prior to the expiration of their terms, while the
second, a "resign to run" provision, mandated that specified elected offi-
cials would automatically resign from their positions upon announcing
candidacy for another elected position.44 In another bout of language that
lower courts cite both to acknowledge and repudiate constitutional pro-
tection for a public employee's candidacy, a plurality of the Court noted:
"Far from recognizing candidacy as a 'fundamental right,' we have held
that the existence of barriers to a candidate's access to the ballot 'does
not of itself compel close scrutiny." 45 The provision imposing a "waiting
period" on judges before they could seek candidacy did not violate equal
protection because the limitation inflicted only "a de minimis burden on
the political aspirations of a current officeholder" and "[u]nlike filing fees
or the level-of-support requirements, . . . in no way burden[ed] access to
the political process by those who are outside the 'mainstream' of politi-
cal life." 46 And since "a waiting period is hardly a significant barrier to
candidacy" and merely an "insignificant interference with access to the
ballot," the rational basis test was the appropriate standard of review for
equal protection analysis. 47 The resign to run provision imposed an even
lesser burden on candidates and had no discriminatory effect, so the
Court addressed its constitutionality under a rational basis review as
well. 4 8 Since there was a rational connection between the provisions and
compelling government interests, both were upheld by the plurality. 49 A
majority of the Court, joined by Justice Stevens, held in the alternative
that the provisions did not violate the First Amendment as applied to the
states through the Due Process Clause because "[t]he State's interests .. .
are sufficient to warrant the de minimis interference with [the candi-
date's] interests in candidacy."50 The Eleventh Circuit cites this language
as its primary basis for recognizing First Amendment protection for
candidacy.5'
44. 457 U.S. 957, 960, 971-72 (1982).
45. Id. at 963 (plurality opinion) (quoting Bullock, 405 U.S. at 143); see discussion
infra Part III.
46. Clements, 457 U.S. at 967-68 (plurality opinion).
47. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
48. Id. at 970.
49. Id. at 968, 970.
50. Id. at 971-72 (majority opinion).
51. See discussion infra Part III-B.
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B. METHODOLOGIES GOVERNING FIRST AMENDMENT DISMISSALS
OF PUBLIC EMPLOYEES
The government ordinarily cannot constitutionally retaliate against a
public employee for engaging in an activity that is protected by the First
Amendment.52 However, there are instances where a public employee's
freedom of expression or freedom of association conflicts with his gov-
ernment employer's ability to fulfill its duties to the public.53 The Su-
preme Court has developed tests to determine when an employer can
make an adverse employment decision against a public employee in re-
sponse to his exercise of freedom of expression or freedom of
association. 54
1. Freedom of Expression Framework
In Pickering v. Board of Education and its progeny, the Supreme Court
articulated a two-part inquiry to determine whether an adverse employ-
ment action violates a public employee's freedom of expression.55 Retali-
ation is unconstitutional if (1) the public employee's speech addresses a
matter of public concern, and (2) the public employee's individual rights
to the speech exceed his government employer's interest in maintaining
efficiency in the completion of its duties.56
The first prong of so-called Pickering analysis, the public concern test,
recognizes that speech on private matters "does not implicate the same
constitutional concerns" as speech on matters of public concern.57 Unlike
with speech on matters of public concern, restricting speech on private
matters poses "no threat to the free and robust debate of public is-
sues; . . . no potential interference with a meaningful dialogue of ideas;
and . . . [no] risk of a reaction of self-censorship on matters of public
import."58 While "the boundaries of the public concern test are not well
defined" and require examination of "the content, form, and context of
[the] speech, as revealed by the whole record," several "guiding princi-
ples" have been articulated by the Supreme Court.59 The public concern
test is satisfied when speech "can be fairly considered as relating to any
matter of political, social, or other concern to the community, or when it
is a subject of legitimate news interest; that is, a subject of general interest
and of value and concern to the public." 60 The second prong of analysis,
the Pickering balancing test, requires a close examination of the speech
52. Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 514-15 (1980).
53. See Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 367-68 (1976) (plurality opinion); Pickering v.
Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968).
54. See Elrod, 427 U.S. at 363, 367-68; Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568.
55. 391 U.S. at 568; Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 145-47 (1983).
56. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 418 (2006) (citing Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568;
Connick, 461 U.S. at 147).
57. Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1215 (2011).
58. Id. at 1215-16 (internal quotation marks omitted).
59. Id. at 1216 (quoting City of San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 83 (2004) (per curiam))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
60. Id. at 1216 (quoting Connick, 461 U.S. at 146; Roe, 543 U.S. at 83-84).
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and its effect.61 The employee's constitutional interest in speaking on
matters of public concern "varies depending [on] the nature of the . . .
expression." 62 The government's interest in dismissing the employee also
requires a highly fact-intensive analysis of all the circumstances surround-
ing the speech, the employee's role within the government department,
his relationship to superiors and co-workers, and the effect of the speech
on the department's operations. 63
2. Policymaker Framework
The Supreme Court developed a related but separate doctrine in re-
sponse to the previously rampant practice of political patronage, in which
elected officials would dismiss public employees exclusively because of
their political affiliation." In Elrod v. Burns, a sheriff won the election
while running on a Democratic ticket and then proceeded to fire a large
number of Republican public employees that were subject to his com-
mand.65 The Supreme Court held that an adverse employment decision
based on the political affiliation of an employee is only constitutional if it
"further[s] some vital government end by a means that is least restrictive
of freedom of belief and association in achieving that end, and the benefit
gained ... outweigh[s] the loss of constitutionally protected rights." 66 The
Elrod balancing test is satisfied, enabling dismissal based on political affil-
iation, as to certain employees who qualify as "policymakers" to "insure
that policies which the electorate has sanctioned are effectively imple-
mented." 67 The Court rejected arguments that patronage dismissals can
be justified in order to improve government effectiveness, increase em-
ployee efficiency, or preserve the two-party system. 68 In Branti v. Finkel,
the Court addressed patronage dismissals again, clarifying that an em-
ployee in a particular position is a policymaker if "party affiliation is an
appropriate requirement for the effective performance of the public of-
fice involved." 69 There is some dispute as to whether Branti completely
reformulated the Elrod balancing test or rather clarified its mode of
operation.70
III. CURRENT STATE OF THE LAW
"Precedent in the area of constitutional protection for candidacy can be
61. Connick, 461 U.S. at 150-53.
62. Id. at 150.
63. 2 RODNEY A. SMOLLA, SMOLLA & NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH § 18:17
(2012).
64. Elrod v. Burns 427 U.S. 347, 350-51, 363, 367-68 (1976) (plurality opinion).
65. Id. at 350-51.
66. Id. at 363.
67. Id. at 372.
68. Id. at 364-66, 368-69.
69. 445 U.S. 507, 518 (1980).
70. See Christopher V. Fenlon, Note, The Spoils System in Check? Public Employees'
Right to Political Affiliation & the Balkanized Policymaking Exception to § 1983 Liability
for Wrongful Termination, 30 CARDOzo L. REv. 2295, 2310 & n.61 (2009).
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best described as a legal morass."71 A three-way split divides the circuits
concerning the existence of and rationale for protection afforded to a
public employee who announces candidacy to run for public office. The
Sixth and Seventh Circuits hold that announcing candidacy alone does
not implicate the First Amendment. 72 Only when the candidate engages
in activity during the course of his campaign that independently consti-
tutes speech of a public concern under Pickering or political association
under Elrod will the First Amendment come into play. 7 3 In direct con-
flict, the Eleventh Circuit holds that candidacy in and of itself is protected
by the First Amendment.74 The Fifth and Tenth Circuits adopt a compro-
mise position under which the announcement of candidacy is per se
speech of public concern that is protected under Pickering.75 The Ninth
Circuit apparently recognizes that the announcement of candidacy is a
content-based communication protected under the First Amendment. 76
A. THE SIXTH AND SEVENTH CIRCUITS:
No PROTECTION FOR CANDIDACY
The Sixth and Seventh Circuits both decidedly reject any notion that
candidacy in and of itself is protected by the First Amendment. In Carver
v. Dennis, a deputy clerk announced that she would challenge her supe-
rior in the upcoming election for county clerk.77 The incumbent county
clerk, displeased with the candidacy announcement, swiftly dismissed the
deputy.78 The Sixth Circuit rejected the applicability of Elrod, emphasiz-
ing that the deputy clerk was "fired . . . for her rival candidacy, . . . [not]
for her political beliefs, her expression of those beliefs, or her political
affiliations." 7 9 The court additionally refused to classify the deputy clerk's
announcement as speech on a matter of public concern under Pickering
because she "[n]either held [n]or voiced any opinions."80 The court then
relied on Bullock and Clements, concluding that the First Amendment
provides no guarantee for political candidacy.81 The Seventh Circuit
reached a similar result in Newcomb v. Brennan, where an incumbent city
attorney dismissed a deputy city attorney following the deputy's decision
to run for city attorney.82 The court quoted Bullock's "no fundamental
status to candidacy" language as support for the proposition that an "in-
terest in seeking office, by itself, is not entitled to constitutional
71. Randall v. Scott, 610 F.3d 701, 710 (11th Cir. 2010).
72. Carver v. Dennis, 104 F.3d 847, 853 (6th Cir. 1997); Newcomb v. Brennan, 558 F.2d
825, 828 (7th Cir. 1977).
73. Murphy v. Cockrell, 505 F.3d 446, 451 (6th Cir. 2007).
74. Randall, 610 F.3d at 713.
75. Jantzen v. Hawkins, 188 F.3d 1247, 1257 (10th Cir. 1999); Click v. Copeland, 970
F.2d 106, 111-12 (5th Cir. 1992).
76. Finkelstein v. Bergna, 924 F.2d 1449, 1453 (9th Cir. 1991).
77. 104 F.3d at 848.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 850.
80. Id. at 852.
81. Id. at 852.




Nevertheless, the Sixth and Seventh Circuits acknowledge that the First
Amendment protects a candidate's campaign activities separate from the
mere announcement of candidacy. 84 In the Seventh Circuit, a dismissed
public employee must allege that the dismissal resulted from expression
or political views "as distinct from the fact of her candidacy."85 For in-
stance, the deputy clerk in Newcomb argued that his dismissal was an
attempt to "discourage [his] candidacy in particular," such that another
individual employed in the same position by the same county clerk with
different political ideals would not have been dismissed in response to the
announcement of candidacy for the position of county clerk. 86 Assuming
the deputy clerk's allegations to be true, his dismissal "represented pun-
ishment by the state based on the content of a communicative act."87 The
First Amendment prohibits content-based restrictions on expression, so
the dismissal "implicate[d] interests which are broader than a per se right
to candidacy."88 Accordingly, the deputy clerk's dismissal ran afoul of the
First Amendment.89
The Sixth Circuit explicates a view that "cases involving political
speech by public employees proceed on a continuum" and endeavors to
distinguish between "the simple announcement of candidacy, which does
not trigger protected political speech, and an announcement coupled with
speech critical of one's opponent (and boss), which does trigger constitu-
tional protection."90 In Murphy v. Cockrell, the Sixth Circuit held that the
campaign activities of a deputy employee and candidate for Property
Value Administrator (PVA) implicated his freedom of expression. 91 In
this instance, the incumbent PVA had abstained from seeking reelection,
so the deputy's political rival was a co-worker. 92 The deputy's campaign
signs attacked his opponent's ability to perform the job of PVA and con-
demned his move from the Democratic to Republican party shortly
before the election. 93 The court agreed that the deputy's criticism of his
opponent was political speech touching on matters of public concern, ac-
cepting the argument that "the ultimate political consideration in any
race is who is the better candidate." 94 Similarly, in Pierce v. Bennett, a
deputy sheriff spoke on matters of public concern after announcing his
83. Id. at 828.
84. Murphy v. Cockrell, 505 F.3d 446, 451 (6th Cir. 2007); Newcomb, 558 F.2d at
828-29.
85. Bart v. Telford, 677 F.2d 622, 625 (7th Cir. 1982).
86. 558 F.2d at 828 (emphasis added).
87. Id.
88. Id. at 828-29.
89. Id. at 829. The Seventh Circuit ultimately ruled in favor of the county clerk after
finding the government's interest in the dismissal to be substantial enough to satisfy a bal-
ancing test. Id. at 830-31.
90. Greenwell v. Parsley, 541 F.3d 401, 404 (6th Cir. 2008).
91. 505 F.3d 446, 448, 451 (6th Cir. 2007).
92. Id. at 448.
93. Id. at 448-49.
94. Id. at 452.
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candidacy against the incumbent sheriff in an upcoming election.95 The
candidates conducted a "mild and civil" campaign in which the deputy
placed advertisements claiming that he would be a "working sheriff" and
suggested that his future employees would exhibit analogous "working"
attributes.96 Despite an absence of aggressive campaigning and personal
attacks by the deputy against his opponent, the district court had "no
difficulty" in concluding that the deputy's campaign activities spoke on
matters of public concern. 97 The campaign advertisements impliedly
"criticiz[ed] the current Sheriff, his policies, and the fitness of his
deputies."98
The Sixth Circuit's methodology conspicuously requires an inquiry into
the subjective motivation for the public employee's dismissal.99 Even
when a candidate engages in political speech touching on matters of pub-
lic concern, his government employer can constitutionally take retaliatory
action if he is responding to the fact of candidacy as opposed to the candi-
date's political speech.100 In Greenwell v. Parsley, the Sixth Circuit deter-
mined that the dismissal of a deputy police officer by the sheriff was not
in response to an expression on matters of public concern because there
was no evidence that the termination was for reasons other than the dep-
uty's candidacy.101 The deputy was discharged immediately following his
announcement of candidacy in a local newspaper that was accompanied
by remarks pointedly suggesting ways the department could be im-
proved. 102 While the remarks in the newspaper may have spoken to mat-
ters of public concern, there was simply no evidence presented by the
employee indicating the dismissal was for reasons aside from the candi-
dacy itself.'03 Likewise, in Murphy, a dissenting judge disputed whether
the facts could be distinguished from Carver because he did not believe
that the deputy met her burden of proving that the motivation for her
dismissal was her critical speech rather than the fact of her candidacy.104
While the Sixth Circuit continues to follow Carver, several recent opin-
ions within the circuit criticize its logic and outcome.' 05 In Myers v. Dean,
the Sixth Circuit addressed facts that were "nearly identical" to Carver
and consequently could not be distinguished.106 The court stressed the
absurdity of the Carver rule which essentially provides that a public em-
ployee "is protected from retaliation for supporting any candidate other
95. 835 F. Supp. 2d 288, 293-94 (W.D. Ky. 2011).
96. Id. at 290, 293.
97. Id. at 293-94.
98. Id. at 293.
99. See Greenwell v. Parsley, 541 F.3d 401, 404 (6th Cir. 2008).
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 403.
103. Id. at 403-04.
104. Murphy v. Cockrell, 505 F.3d 446, 456 (6th Cir. 2007) (Guy, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
105. Greenwell, 541 F.3d at 405 (Martin, J., concurring); Myers v. Dean, 216 F. App'x
552, 554 (6th Cir. 2007); Becton v. Thomas, 48 F. Supp. 2d 747, 756-57 (W.D. Tenn. 1999).
106. 216 F. App'x at 553-54.
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than herself."07 In a dissenting opinion, Judge Martin argued that Bul-
lock's holding only concerned whether states must include the names of
individuals who want to run for public office on ballots.108 Judge Martin
also construed Clements to be "expressly distinguished [from] cases
where a civil servant is the candidate."109 Consequently, the holding of
Carver improperly relied on the Supreme Court's ballot access cases.110
A district court even discussed the possibility that Carver's holding
should be limited to its specific facts involving the dismissal of "an at-will
employee in a two-person office" for running against her superior, the
only other person in the office."'
B. THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT: FIRST AMENDMENT GUARANTEES
RIGHT TO CANDIDACY
The Eleventh Circuit adopts the position that candidacy is protected by
the First Amendment.112 In Randall v. Scott, a district attorney's chief of
staff announced his intent to seek election to the County Board of Com-
missioners.113 The district attorney, whose husband was also seeking elec-
tion to the Board, fired the staff member.114 The court first considered
the relevant Supreme Court precedent, interpreting Bullock's "no funda-
mental status to candidacy" language as relevant only to the standard of
review to be applied under equal protection." 5 Continuing, the majority
argued that Clements "suggests that political candidacy is entitled to at
least a modicum of constitutional protection."1 6 Moreover, the similarity
between "supporting a candidate," which is protected under Elrod, and
"being a candidate" reinforces the need to protect candidacy.117 After
also considering its own precedent, the court concluded that candidacy
"lies at the core of values protected by the First Amendment."s18 Accord-
ingly, the chief of staff's dismissal violated his First Amendment interest
in candidacy." 9 Because the Eleventh Circuit interpreted candidacy as a
right distinct from expression or association, neither Pickering nor Elrod
analysis governed.120 Instead, the court articulated a new balancing test
whereby the dismissal must be "of sufficient importance to justify the in-
107. Id. at 554. Elrod will protect public employees who support other political candi-
dates from dismissal so long as they are not policymakers. Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347,
353-54, 363, 386 n.10 (1976) (plurality opinion).
108. Greenwell, 541 F.3d at 405 (Martin, J., concurring).
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Becton v. Thomas, 48 F. Supp. 2d 747, 756-57 (W.D. Tenn. 1999) (quoting Carver
v. Dennis, 104 F.3d 847, 849 (6th Cir. 1997)).
112. Randall v. Scott, 610 F.3d 701, 713 (11th Cir. 2010).
113. Id. at 703.
114. Id. at 704.
115. Id. at 711.
116. Id. at 711-12. The Randall court does not clearly articulate why Clements should
be read to suggest constitutional protection for candidacy. See id.
117. Randall, 610 F.3d at 711.
118. Id. at 713.




fringement of [the public employee's] First Amendment right to run for
[public office]." 121 Somewhat confusingly, the court restated the test as
requiring that "the state's interest in preventing an individual from run-
ning for office" be greater than "the individual's First Amendment right
to run."122 The court refrained from defining the "level of scrutiny" that
should be applied to a dismissal based purely on candidacy, holding only
that a "decision to run for office enjoys some First Amendment protec-
tion." 123 Since the chief of staff was fired for personal reasons, and the
candidacy did not impair any state interest, the balancing test weighed in
favor of the chief of staff such that his dismissal was unconstitutional.124
In Underwood v. Harkins, the Eleventh Circuit further developed its
political candidacy jurisprudence when a recently elected superior court
clerk fired her political rival and former co-worker, a deputy clerk, whom
she defeated in the Republican primary election before ultimately win-
ning the general election.125 The Eleventh Circuit rearticulated the con-
tradictory balancing approach outlined in Randall, stating that "the
appropriate standard for candidacy dismissals" is identical to the "balanc-
ing test between a discharged employee's First Amendment right to sup-
port a candidate and the state's interest in office loyalty."126 The court
relied on precedent developing the Elrod policymaker exception to assess
the government's interest in removing a public employee based on candi-
dacy.127 Because the policymaker exception under Elrod "employ[s] a
balancing test laced with a form of heightened scrutiny," the court ac-
knowledged that it was also applying a form of heightened scrutiny to
candidacy dismissals.128 The court concluded that the deputy clerk occu-
pied a policymaking position under Elrod.129 Consequently, the deputy
clerk's "rights los[t] out under a Randall balancing analysis" to the state's
interest because a court clerk "must be able to select a deputy in whom
she has total trust and confidence and from whom she can expect, without
question, undivided loyalty."1 30
C. THE FIFTH, NINTH, AND TENTH CIRCUITS: CANDIDACY
ANNOUNCEMENTS PROTECTED AS FORM OF EXPRESSION
The Fifth and Tenth Circuits hold that an announcement of candidacy
121. Id.
122. Id. In the first articulation of the test, the court compares the employee's constitu-
tional rights to the government's need to dismiss him in response to the exercise of consti-
tutional rights. See id. In the second articulation of the test, the court compares the
employee's constitutional rights to the government's need to prevent him from exercising
his rights. See id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. 698 F.3d 1335, 1337-38 (11th Cir. 2012).
126. Id. at 1340.
127. Id. at 1342-43.
128. Id. at 1343 n.4.




constitutes speech on matters of public concern under Pickering.131 In
Click v. Copeland, two deputies announced their candidacies to run
against their superior, the incumbent sheriff, in the upcoming election.132
The Fifth Circuit held that their subsequent demotion violated the First
Amendment because "[i]t is undisputed that [the deputies'] conduct, run-
ning for elected office, addressed matters of public concern." 133 Applying
the Pickering balancing test, the demotion was unjustified because there
was no evidence that the "political candidacies had any effect on their
performance, on others' performance, on discipline, or on harmony
among coworkers." 134 In Jantzen v. Hawkins, an incumbent sheriff imme-
diately dismissed a deputy sheriff after the deputy's candidacy announce-
ment.135 Like the Fifth Circuit, the Tenth Circuit determined that
announcing candidacy was "political speech" which "undoubtedly relates
to matters of public concern." 136 However, under the Pickering balancing
test, the dismissal was justified because "when a subordinate runs for of-
fice against his or her boss, such a candidacy risks undermining that of-
fice's efficient performance."1 37 The Jantzen court also held that the
deputy sheriff's freedom of political affiliation was not implicated, even
though he was declaring his candidacy against his boss, because "the right
to political affiliation does not encompass the mere right to affiliate with
oneself." 38
The Fifth Circuit has also held that a public employee's dismissal can
implicate the First Amendment even prior to an announcement of candi-
dacy under narrow circumstances where the employee had previously en-
gaged in protected political activities and it was expected that an
announcement of candidacy would be forthcoming. 139 In Jordan v. Ector
County, two co-workers, deputy clerks, ran against each other for the of-
fice of district clerk in 2002.140 After prevailing in the 2002 election, the
newly elected district clerk demoted her rival.141 Three years later,
shortly prior to the 2006 election for the same position, the deputy was
dismissed.142 At the time she was fired, the deputy had not announced
her candidacy for the 2006 election, though her coworkers generally ex-
pected her to run for the position again.143 The district clerk conceded
that part of her reason for dismissing the deputy was that "she thought it
131. Jantzen v. Hawkins, 188 F.3d 1247, 1257 (10th Cir. 1999); Click v. Copeland, 970
F.2d 106, 112 (5th Cir. 1992).
132. 970 F.2d at 108.
133. Id. at 112.
134. Id.
135. 188 F.3d at 1250.
136. Id. at 1257.
137. Id. at 1258.
138. Id. at 1252.
139. Jordan v. Ector Cnty., 516 F.3d 290, 296-98 (5th Cir. 2008).






would be 'easier' to run against a disgruntled former employee."144 The
Fifth Circuit first noted that "an unexpressed intent to run" is not pro-
tected without "some outward manifestation" of First Amendment activ-
ity.145 The deputy clerk's 2002 campaign certainly addressed matters of
public concern and political affiliation.146 After concluding that the 2002
campaign implicated the First Amendment, the Fifth Circuit proceeded to
address whether the dismissal, if it was a preemptive retaliatory measure
in anticipation of the 2006 election, violated the First Amendment.147 Be-
cause "there were signals, however subtle, that [the deputy clerk] contin-
ued to be and would be [the district clerk's] political rival," the 2006
election could not be considered in complete isolation from the 2002 cam-
paign.148 The two clerks remained political opponents, even absent a dec-
laration of candidacy by the deputy.149 Consequently, the deputy clerk
demonstrated "outward signs" of First Amendment protected political af-
filiation during the period of time leading up to the 2006 election.o50 Be-
cause the clerk's political activities did not cause any disruption
whatsoever, the balancing test weighed in favor of the deputy clerk. 51
The Ninth Circuit protects a public employee's candidacy announce-
ment under the theory that "[djisciplinary action discouraging a candi-
date's bid for elective office 'represent[s] punishment by the state based
on the content of a communicative act." 152 Notwithstanding reliance on
Newcomb for this proposition, the Ninth Circuit employs substantially
broader language than its sister circuit.' 53 Newcomb emphasized that the
deputy clerk's dismissal was motivated by the desire to prevent that par-
ticular deputy clerk from running for office.1 54 The implication is that
preventing a specific employee, but not necessarily others with different
political ideas and policies, from running for office effectively amounts to
an attempt to curb the content only of the dismissed employee's commu-
nication. 55 But the Ninth Circuit does not limit its language to situations
where a dismissal based on the employee's candidacy, the communicative
act, is a response to that particular employee's political views.156 Instead,
the Ninth Circuit's language suggests that discouraging any candidacy is
per se punishment based on the content of a communicative act.' 57
144. Id.
145. Id. at 296-97.
146. Id. at 297.
147. Id. at 296-98. It was necessary to resolve this issue because the motivation for the
dismissal was disputed. Id. at 296. The court had to consider whether the dismissal was in
response to the 2002 campaign or an anticipated 2006 campaign. Id.
148. Id. at 297-98.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 298.
151. Id. at 299.
152. Finkelstein v. Bergna, 924 F.2d 1449, 1453 (9th Cir. 1991) (quoting Newcomb v.
Brennan, 558 F.2d 825, 828-29 (7th Cir. 1977)).
153. Newcomb, 558 F.2d at 828-29.
154. Id.
155. See id.




D. PRONG Two OF A FIRST AMENDMENT CANDIDACY DISMISSAL:
THE BALANCING TEST
Irrespective of contradictory attitudes toward candidacy, each circuit
will apply some form of balancing test in the event that a public em-
ployee's dismissal implicates the First Amendment, be that at the an-
nouncement of candidacy or sometime thereafter. Complicating matters
is the reality that the scope of Elrod and Pickering overlap, and quite
often a public employee running for political office will be fired for rea-
sons amounting to a combination of his political affiliation and speech on
matters of public concern.158 The circuits are divided concerning the
proper interaction between the policymaker exception and Pickering.159
Nevertheless, Pickering balancing tends to be the dominant approach ap-
plied by courts for a candidacy dismissal unless the court construes the
retaliation as exclusively in response to the candidate's political affilia-
tion.160 The Eleventh Circuit, however, espoused an innovative balancing
test, distinct from Pickering, when considering only the announcement of
candidacy.161 The court relies on Elrod policymaker precedent to guide
its application.162 The specific contours of the Eleventh Circuit's test re-
main uncertain due to inconsistent articulation and limited precedent.163
When conducting Pickering balancing, courts regularly uphold dismis-
sals of public employees when the government introduces evidence of
actual disruption.164 Lacking actual disruption, the employee can still be
dismissed when the circumstances indicate a sufficient likelihood of dis-
158. See Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 350-51, 363, 367-68 (1976) (plurality opinion);
Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968).
159. Curinga v. City of Clairton, 357 F.3d 305, 313 n.8 (3d Cir. 2004). The Curinga court
describes a three-way circuit split regarding the dismissal of a public employee holding a
policymaking position for both speech on public concern and political affiliation. Id. The
Third, Fifth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits apply the Pickering balancing test. Id. The First,
Second, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits hold that a policymaker can be dismissed uncondition-
ally without the need to apply Pickering balancing for political speech. Id. In the Ninth
Circuit, a policymaker can be dismissed for any speech, whether or not it relates to his
political views. Id. When the public employee is not a policymaker under Elrod, all the
Circuits will apply Pickering. See id.
160. Paul R. Koster, Election Battles and Their Impact on the Public Employer, 38 URB.
LAw. 1187, 1191 (2006) (reviewing factors considered by courts when applying Pickering
balancing in the context of candidacy dismissals).
161. Underwood v. Harkins, 698 F.3d 1335, 1340 (11th Cir. 2012); Randall v. Scott, 610
F.3d 701, 714 (11th Cir. 2010).
162. Underwood, 698 F.3d at 1342-43.
163. See supra text accompanying notes 120-22, 126-30.
164. See Newcomb v. Brennan, 558 F.2d 825, 830-31 (7th Cir. 1977) ("[O]nce an open
rift developed between the city attorney and his deputy even if the basis for the feud were
unrelated to actual job performance the city attorney's office could become a battleground
in which little was accomplished, to the detriment of the citizens."); Pierce v. Bennett, 835
F. Supp. 2d 288, 297-98 (W.D. Ky. 2011) (holding that government interests exceeded dis-
missed deputy's interests when the deputy's candidacy exacerbated preexisting tensions to
the extent that they "actually impeded the functioning of the department"). But see Mur-
phy v. Cockrell, 505 F.3d 446, 452-53 (6th Cir. 2007) (holding that deputy clerk's interest in
expressing political views outweighed the "negative impact ... [of] the deterioration of
[their] relationship . . . and the resultant tension in the office").
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ruption.165 Important factors influencing the probability of disruption in-
clude the size of the office, the level of loyalty required from the public
employee's position, whether the public employee's political opponent is
his boss, and the temporal proximity between the employee's candidacy
and his dismissal.166
IV. ANALYSIS
A. DISTINGUISHING THE "BALLOT ACCESS" CASES FROM THE
CIRCUMSTANCES UNIQUE TO A CANDIDACY DISMISSAL
As noted, the circuits sharply dispute whether Supreme Court prece-
dent endorses First Amendment protection for candidacy.167 The Sixth
and Seventh Circuits interpret Bullock's rejection of a "fundamental sta-
tus to candidacy as to invoke a rigorous standard of review" to absolutely
foreclose upon any First Amendment attachment of a right to candi-
dacy.168 Yet, the Eleventh Circuit cites the same language and concludes
that the First Amendment provides "at least some" protection despite no
"fundamental status to candidacy."1 69 One commentator criticizes the
Eleventh Circuit's position as "well intentioned" but only "tenuously
grounded in Supreme Court precedent."o70 In this Part, it is argued that
Supreme Court precedent is too ambiguous to provide reasonably defini-
tive support for either position.
In light of divergent interpretations, the context of Bullock and Cle-
ments must be closely analyzed. Two interpretations of Bullock are rea-
sonable. First, by denying "a fundamental status to candidacy," the
Supreme Court may have been stating that for purposes of equal protec-
tion analysis, the right to candidacy is not a fundamental right and thus
not subject to strict scrutiny analysis.171 Alternatively, the Supreme Court
may have intended to convey that there is no right to candidacy whatso-
ever, fundamental or otherwise. 172 Since the Bullock Court was address-
ing the standard of review to apply under an equal protection challenge,
it goes to reason that the Court was only referring to the status of candi-
dacy as it pertains to equal protection.173 Had the Court intended its lan-
guage to unequivocally bar any protection for candidacy under the First
165. See Kent v. Martin, 252 F.3d 1141, 1144 (10th Cir. 2001) (noting that predictions of
disruption can justify a dismissal but only when the adverse employment action is taken
shortly after the employee's conduct that is likely to lead to disruption).
166. Koster, supra note 160, at 1191-92.
167. Compare Randall v. Scott, 610 F.3d 701, 711-12 (11th Cir. 2010), with Carver v.
Dennis, 104 F.3d 847, 850-51 (6th Cir. 1997), and Newcomb v. Brennan, 558 F.2d 825, 828
(7th Cir. 1977).
168. Newcomb, 558 F.2d at 828; see Carver, 104 F.3d at 850-51.
169. Randall, 610 F.3d at 711, 713.
170. Kevin C. Quigley, Comment, Wading Through the "Morass": The Eleventh Circuit
Recognizes a Right to Candidacy in Randall v. Scott, 52 B.C. L. REV. E-SUPPLEMENT 185,
185 (2011).
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Amendment, it would not have so cavalierly used the word "fundamen-
tal."17 4 Reliance on Bullock to reject First Amendment protection for
candidacy takes the Court's language entirely out of context and is
misplaced.175
On the other hand, the Eleventh Circuit's reliance on Bullock as sup-
port for a right to candidacy is correspondingly dubious.17 6 Even if the
Bullock Court merely rejected candidacy as a fundamental right for pur-
poses of equal protection, the fact that "candidacy is linked to voters'
rights" does not necessarily imply that candidacy is protected by the First
Amendment.' 77 Despite acknowledging a connection between candidacy,
voting, and the First Amendment, the Court hardly compels the conclu-
sion that, by itself, candidacy is protected by the First Amendment. 78
Rather, and more likely, a restriction on candidacy that limits the choices
of voters will impair the freedom of association of those voters.17 9 Bullock
acknowledges that "laws . . . affect[ing] candidates always have at least
some theoretical, correlative effect on voters."180 But even accepting that
laws restricting candidacy often intrude upon the First Amendment rights
of voters does not mean that candidacy itself is invariably protected.'18 If,
for instance, it could be shown that a particular candidacy restriction did
not in any way impose upon the First Amendment rights of voters, the
Court might conclude that the restriction does not implicate the First
Amendment at all.18 2 Admittedly a statutory candidacy restriction that
does not constitutionally impose upon voters may be inconceivable, as
suggested by the Court.18 3 However, the nature of a candidacy dismissal
is notably distinct from the candidacy restrictions considered in the ballot
access cases.'" Unlike a law restricting candidacy, a candidacy dismissal
has no immediate or direct impact on voters because the dismissal itself
in no way inhibits the candidate from continuing his campaign and ap-
pearing on the ballots of voters.18 5 So even accepting that all candidacy
restrictions burden the rights of voters, candidacy dismissals do not neces-
sarily elicit the same causal effect.186 Consequently, Bullock's close focus
on the rights of voters distinguishes it from a candidacy dismissal where
the rights of voters are not automatically subject to any immediate risk. 87
And the Bullock Court certainly does not mandate constitutional protec-
174. See id.
175. See id.
176. See Randall v. Scott, 610 F.3d 701, 711 (11th Cir. 2010).
177. See id. (citing Bullock, 405 U.S. at 142-43).
178. See Bullock, 405 U.S. at 142-43.
179. See id. at 142-44.




184. See, e.g., id. at 142-43, 145.




tion for candidacy without a corresponding deprivation to voters.' 88
The Eleventh Circuit latches onto an additional quotation from Cle-
ments in support of a right to candidacy that similarly ignores the distinc-
tion between laws restricting candidacy and candidacy dismissals. 189 The
Clements Court upheld the candidacy restriction because it imposed only
a "de minimis interference" with "First Amendment interests in candi-
dacy." 190 Out of context, referring to "First Amendment interests in can-
didacy" could fairly straightforwardly be interpreted as an
acknowledgement that there are in fact First Amendment interests in
candidacy. 191 However, the language need not be construed so broadly.
Rather, the "First Amendment interests in candidacy" referred to by the
Court are best interpreted as the interests of voters upon which the candi-
dacy restriction intruded.192
Other courts have further elaborated upon the significance of the Cle-
ments plurality's declaration that "far from recognizing candidacy as a
'fundamental right,' we have held that the existence of barriers to a candi-
date's access to the ballot 'does not of itself compel close scrutiny.'"193
The Kentucky Supreme Court constructed a novel argument in opposi-
tion to a right of candidacy, arguing that the use of "far from" is synony-
mous with "of a distinctly different and especially opposite quality
than."194 Further, because "the 'especially opposite quality' of a funda-
mental right is 'no right at all,"' the court reasoned that "a sound-and
perhaps the better-parsing of Bullocks and Clements is that there is no
constitutional right at all to candidacy."1 9 5 Notwithstanding the Cook
court's view, the "especially opposite quality of a fundamental right" is
not "no right at all" but rather no fundamental right at all.19 6 A "funda-
mental right" is a term of art that governs whether to employ a height-
ened standard of review under equal protection analysis. 197 In other
words, "far from" does not modify the existence of a constitutional right
to candidacy; instead, "far from" modifies the constitutional status of can-
didacy as fundamental and thereby necessitating a strict scrutiny standard
of review.198 Like the language in Bullock referencing fundamental
rights, the similar language in Clements is equally ambiguous and un-
helpful for determining the status of candidacy under the First
Amendment.199
188. See id.
189. See Randall v. Scott, 610 F.3d 701, 711-12 (11th Cir. 2010).
190. Clements v. Fashing, 457 U.S. 957, 971-72 (1982).
191. See id.
192. See id.
193. Id. at 963 (plurality opinion) (quoting Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 143 (1972));
see Randall v. Scott, 610 F.3d 701, 711-12 (11th Cir. 2010); Carver v. Dennis, 104 F.3d 847,
850-51 (6th Cir. 1997); Newcomb v. Brennan, 558 F.2d 825, 828 (7th Cir. 1977).
194. Cook v. Popplewell, 394 S.W.3d 323, 331-32 (Ky. 2011).
195. Id. at 332.
196. See id.
197. 16B AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 863 (2012).
198. See Clements v. Fashing, 457 U.S. 957, 963 (1982) (plurality opinion).
199. See id.; Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 142-43 (1972).
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On the whole, Supreme Court precedent concerning a right to candi-
dacy is simply not clear enough to make any concrete determinations.
The Court primarily grounded its examination of candidacy restrictions
on the constitutional rights of voters under the Equal Protection Clause.
Conversely, candidacy dismissals do not necessarily implicate the rights of
voters and require analysis under the Due Process Clause. Consequently,
reliance on the ballot access cases to ascertain the constitutional status of
candidacy in the context of candidacy dismissals is improper.
B. FIRST AMENDMENT PROTECTION FOR CANDIDACY AS A MEANS
To DERIVATIVELY PRESERVE RELATED
FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS
A right to candidacy should be protected by the First Amendment in
order to preserve the eventual exercise of core First Amendment rights,
both the rights of candidates and those of voters, during the course of a
campaign and election. Assume for the moment that the act of announc-
ing candidacy, with nothing more, amounts to neither an exercise of the
candidate's freedom of speech nor association. In other words, assume
that a candidacy announcement is completely neutral with respect to
unambiguously recognized First Amendment rights. If this were the case,
government employers would have unfettered discretion to retaliate
against public employees who announce candidacy. But consider the sec-
ondary effects on the First Amendment's guarantees flowing from a can-
didacy dismissal. Admittedly, the public employee's demotion or
dismissal would not require him to withdraw his candidacy. Nor would
the candidate be restricted in exercising his freedom of expression and
affiliation during his political campaign if he persists in his quest for pub-
lic office. Assuming he does not withdraw, the general public would have
the same opportunity to engage in political dialogue regarding his creden-
tials and policies. And the choices of voters would not be limited; corre-
spondingly, their freedom of political of affiliation, exercised by voting,
would not be impaired. Arguably, the employee's dismissal could even
have the effect of motivating him to remain in the race. Thus, at first
glance, a candidacy dismissal is distinguishable from the candidacy re-
strictions in the ballot access cases, which necessarily produced some
level of burden on voters.200 But considered on a broader scale, the ef-
fects of a candidacy dismissal are substantially more ruinous. Fear of re-
taliation for announcing candidacy can fairly be assumed to discourage
public employees from seeking public office or announcing candidacy.
And reducing the number of public employees running for office would
deprive potential candidates of the platform from which to voice their
political views, political parties of potential individuals with whom they
could rally around, the general public of the opportunity to engage in
political dialogue facilitated by the would-be candidate's views, and vot-
200. See supra text accompanying notes 176-87.
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ers of the ability to affiliate with the candidate of their choice by casting a
vote in his favor. Accordingly, the long-term practical consequences of a
system permitting candidacy dismissals would noticeably burden undis-
puted First Amendment rights even if they do not pose analogous effects
immediately and in every instance.
In addition, recognizing an interest in candidacy would further the
chief purpose of the First Amendment, which is to preserve the political
processes essential to democracy. 201 The Supreme Court describes a
"close connection between our Nation's commitment to self-government
and . .. the First Amendment" and frequently reinforces the crucial im-
portance of preserving First Amendment protections in the context of
politics. 202 Candidacy furthers this objective of the First Amendment by
derivatively preserving the eventual exercise of freedom of expression
and association, which in turn are preservative of democracy. To deny
constitutional protection for candidacy and allow unrestrained candidacy
dismissals is to curb political speech, repress political processes, and dis-
courage political involvement. Additionally, candidacy itself is an indis-
pensable touchstone of paramount importance in our democratic system
in which citizens elect their representatives. Without candidates, a repre-
sentative democracy by definition cannot exist. Undoubtedly, however,
the relationship between candidacy and the derivative effects on the First
Amendment rights of others is moderately attenuated. As a result, the
level of constitutional protection afforded to candidacy when weighed
against competing interests should be relatively modest, but certainly not
non-existent.
Justice Brennan's view of the First Amendment further supports recog-
nition of First Amendment protection for candidacy as a means to deriva-
tively guarantee other rights. Justice Brennan explains:
[The First Amendment] has a structural role to play in securing and
fostering our republican system of self-government. Implicit in this
structural role is not only the principle that debate on public issues
should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, but also the antece-
dent assumption that valuable public debate-as well as other civic
behavior-must be informed. The structural model links the First
Amendment to that process of communication necessary for a de-
mocracy to survive, and thus entails solicitude not only for communi-
cation itself, but also for the indispensable conditions of meaningful
communication.203
201. See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 339 (2010).
202. Knox v. Serv. Emps. Int'l Union, Local 1000, 132 S. Ct. 2277, 2288 (2012) (citing
Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45, 52 (1982); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 93 (1976) (per
curiam); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 552 (1965); Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357,
375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring); Patterson v. Colorado ex rel. Att'y Gen. of Colorado,
205 U.S. 454, 465 (1907) (Harlan, J., concurring)).
203. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 587-88 (1980) (Brennan, J.,
concurring) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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Stated differently, Justice Brennan believed that the First Amendment
"protects the structure of communications necessary for the existence of
our democracy." 204 Thus, "[t]he press is not only shielded when it speaks
out, but when it performs all the myriad tasks necessary for it to gather
and disseminate the news." 205 Analogizing, candidates should be shielded
not only when fully engaged in a political campaign, but also when taking
the necessary antecedent action of announcing candidacy. 206 Justice
Brennan acknowledged that under a structural model of the First
Amendment, "the stretch of [ ] protection is theoretically endless" be-
cause even the slightest "imposition of any kind on the press will in some
measure affect its ability to perform protected functions." 207 Therefore,
the constitutionality of impositions on the underlying ability of the press
to perform its function depends on a balancing of the constitutional inter-
ests at risk and the benefit to society coinciding with the imposition.208
Likewise, the constitutionality of a candidacy dismissal should depend on
a balancing of interests. 209 Justice Brennan reinforces the validity of his
theory by noting that other constitutional guarantees, including the right
to freedom of association, derive from the need to protect more explicit
constitutional guarantees. 210
C. CANDIDACY ANNOUNCEMENTS AS SPEECH ON MATTERS
OF PUBLIC CONCERN
Even if the First Amendment does not confer a right to candidacy on
its own, the Pickering framework should protect the announcement of
candidacy as a form of expression on matters of public concern.211 While
courts must consider all the circumstances surrounding the speech to de-
termine whether it addresses matters of public concern, the announce-
ment of political candidacy patently implicates "matter[s] of political,
social, or other concern to the community" as required under Connick
and its progeny.212 The Sixth Circuit, however, holds that the announce-
ment of candidacy is neither political speech nor deserving of First
Amendment protection. 213 The Sixth Circuit essentially relies on the pre-
mise that when an individual runs for office, the general public will inter-
pret his actions as singularly an indulgence of his own interests without
concern for the welfare of the citizens he would serve if elected.214 Under
204. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., Address at the Dedication of the S. I. Newhouse
Center for Law and Justice (Oct. 17, 1979), in 32 RUTGERs L. REV. 173, 176.





210. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 588 n.4 (Brennan, J.,
concurring).
211. See Jantzen v. Hawkins, 188 F.3d 1247, 1257 (10th Cir. 1999); Click v. Copeland,
970 F.2d 106, 112 (5th Cir. 1992).
212. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 146 (1983).




a more realistic and less cynical view of democracy, a candidacy an-
nouncement conveys to the community that the policies, goals, and ideas
of the candidate should be applied to better the office which serves the
citizenry whether or not he is elected. Even the mere announcement of
candidacy, without more, implicitly communicates to the world that the
other candidate's policies are inferior to his own and should not be
adopted. On the other hand, it could be argued that a candidacy an-
nouncement alone does not address matters of public concern if the can-
didate has not actually made his policies, beliefs, and ideas known to the
public.
But consider a scenario where two individuals decide to run for public
office and announce their candidacies, but refrain from having any addi-
tional outside contact with the world until after the election. Unless the
two individuals lived in caves, completely isolated from outside contact,
the press would investigate and report on their past, friends (or adversa-
ries) would comment to others about their good and bad characteristics,
and voters would draw conclusions as to who is best fit to serve the com-
munity. In other words, the public's reaction to a candidacy announce-
ment evidences its paramount importance to a community even before
the candidate communicates any policies, beliefs, or ideas to the electo-
rate. Moreover, the announcement generates the very type of public de-
bate, indispensable to democracy, that protection for speech on matters
of public concern is designed to promote.215 Consider Keith Judd, other-
wise known as "Prisoner Number 11593-051," who despite serving a sev-
enteen-year sentence in federal prison, which precluded his ability to
actively campaign, decided to run against incumbent President Obama in
the 2012 West Virginia Democratic primary.216 As President Obama's
sole challenger in West Virginia, Judd won a majority in ten counties and
garnered forty percent of the overall vote.217 The results of the primary
election speak for themselves: Keith Judd conveyed a message merely
through his candidacy that he, a convicted felon, would serve West
Virginians better than the incumbent President Obama.218 Surely Keith
Judd's candidacy amounted to an expression on matters of public
concern. 219
When a public employee announces candidacy against his boss, courts
should have an even simpler task of determining that the announcement
215. See Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207,1215 (2011) ("The First Amendment reflects
a profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be
uninhibited, robust, and wide-open. That is because speech concerning public affairs is
more than self-expression; it is the essence of self-government." (citations omitted) (inter-
nal quotation marks omitted)).
216. Mackenzie Weinger, 10 Facts About Felon Keith Judd, POLTICO (May 9, 2012),
http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0512/76098.html.




219. See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 146 (1983); Tau, supra note 217.
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addresses matters of public concern. Nonetheless, the Sixth Circuit per-
sists in its assertion that the "announcement of candidacy [against a supe-
rior] is nothing more than the assertion of rival candidacy," which does
not implicate the First Amendment.220 Contrary to the Sixth Circuit's
view, when a public employee announces candidacy against his boss, he
implicitly conveys disapproval of the policies and abilities of the current
regime.221 Given the employee's close knowledge of the operations of his
boss's department, the implied disapproval is going to carry even greater
weight than if he were challenging someone else. And improving the ef-
fectiveness or efficiency of a government department, responsible for the
distribution of services intended for the public benefit, is clearly a matter
of public concern. This is not to say that a superior would be powerless to
dismiss an employee who challenges him in an election. The employee's
actions in opposing his superior amount to insubordination, likely creat-
ing an actual disruption in the office, and at a minimum spawning a con-
siderable probability that disruption will result.222 The government is
under no obligation to keep a "viper in the nest" and will have a legiti-
mate interest in dismissing the employee.223 But these are concerns that
are addressed in the Pickering balancing test and are irrelevant to
whether the employee's announcement of candidacy addresses matters of
public concern. 224
D. POLICY IMPACT OF A RIGHT TO CANDIDACY
Protecting candidacy and preventing candidacy dismissals also foster
valuable policy objectives. First, protecting candidacy would promote en-
gagement in the political process. In particular, it would enable public
employees to run for public office without fear of retaliation. Granted,
any public employee who seeks public office could still be dismissed if her
constitutional interests were outweighed by legitimate governmental in-
terests.225 Under the current methodology adopted by the Sixth Circuit,
an employer who receives notice that a public employee is running for
office is incentivized to immediately fire him.2 2 6 If the employee is fired
immediately after announcing his candidacy, no First Amendment rights
will be implicated whatsoever. 227 If the employer were instead to wait
until the individual began actively campaigning, thereby exercising his
freedom of expression or association, then the employer would only be
220. Greenwell v. Parsley, 541 F.3d 401, 404 (6th Cir. 2008).
221. See id.
222. See Bart v. Telford, 677 F.2d 622, 624-25 (6th Cir. 1982) ("Discipline is impossible
to maintain when a subordinate is running for a position in which he would be the boss of
his present superiors.").
223. See Carver v. Dennis, 104 F.3d 847, 853 (6th Cir. 1997).
224. See Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 418 (2006) (describing the Pickering test for
the constitutionality of dismissals implicating the First Amendment as a two-part inquiry:
the public-concern test followed by a balancing test).
225. See Underwood v. Harkins, 698 F.3d 1335, 1340 (11th Cir. 2012).




able to constitutionally fire the employee if the Pickering or Elrod bal-
ancing test is satisfied in his favor.228 Moreover, protecting a candidacy
announcement would obviate the necessity of considering the motivation
for a candidate's dismissal, a necessary element of the Sixth Circuit's
approach. 229
Additionally, recognizing some form of protection for candidacy would
promote ethical campaigning and discourage personal attacks and other
inappropriate behavior that might lead to dissension at the public office.
When a public employee knows that he can conduct a political campaign,
secure in the knowledge that the First Amendment protects him from a
retaliatory dismissal unless his campaign activities create some form of dis-
turbance in the workplace, the public employee will feel a strong incentive
to not engage in behavior that will create workplace disturbances. Under
many circumstances, particularly when the employee is challenging his
superior, the announcement of candidacy would still create a substantial
likelihood of disruption, enabling an immediate and constitutional dismis-
sal.2 3 0 But if the employee challenges a coworker who could not retaliate
until after the election or a superior who does not immediately fire him,
he can ensure his job security by abstaining from any potentially disrup-
tive behavior.
Paradoxically, the Sixth Circuit appears to adopt an extreme view of
candidacy, providing protection exclusively when the candidate's cam-
paign becomes critical of his opponent.231 Though negative political
campaigning is protected by the First Amendment, there is no reason to
protect only negative campaigning without providing parallel protection
for campaigns conducted civilly. The Sixth Circuit's approach fails to rec-
ognize any constitutional protection for candidacy until campaign dia-
logue adopts undertones that will virtually guarantee disruption. 232
Consider a candidate who challenges a coworker. If the candidate con-
ducts a courteous campaign refraining from any criticism of his opponent
and loses, he can be dismissed by his victorious coworker because candi-
dacy alone affords him no protection. But if the candidate disparages his
coworker throughout the election and loses, he similarly can be dismissed
because his behavior would inevitably have caused a substantial disrup-
tion. In essence, the candidate must carefully conduct his campaign in a
manner that criticizes his opponent enough to invoke the First Amend-
ment but not so much as to create a disruption. Application of the Sixth
Circuit's rule undoubtedly produces unreasonable and undesired re-
sults. 2 3 3 At an absolute minimum, the Sixth Circuit should not require a
candidate's campaign speech to criticize his opponent in order to consti-
228. Id.
229. See supra text accompanying notes 99-104.
230. See supra text accompanying notes 164-66.





tute speech on matters of public concern.23 4
E. SHORTCOMINGS OF THE BALANCING TEST APPLIED BY THE
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT FOR CANDIDACY DISMISSALS
If a First Amendment right to candidacy exists, a balancing test must be
applied when a public employee suffers an adverse employment decision
in retaliation for exercising those rights. If announcing candidacy is re-
garded as an expression on matters of public concern, the current Picker-
ing balancing test would remain appropriate. 235 If, however, the right to
candidacy were protected separately, as its own First Amendment guar-
antee, a new balancing test would need to be formulated. The Eleventh
Circuit attempted to create a new balancing test for candidacy, but failed
to articulate it clearly.236 In one formulation of the test, The Eleventh
Circuit asserts that courts should compare "the state's interest in prevent-
ing an individual from running for office to the individual's First Amend-
ment right to run." 237 This test closely resembles Justice Scalia's proposed
articulation of Pickering's balancing test in a dissenting opinion: "whether
[the elected official's] interest in preventing the expression of such state-
ments in his agency outweighed [the employee's] First Amendment inter-
est in making the statement." 238 While acknowledging the need to give
government employers some deference for reasonably predicting future
harm caused by an employee's exercise of speech rights, a majority of the
Supreme Court has never recognized Justice Scalia's extremely pro-em-
ployer articulation of the test, which focuses exclusively on any antici-
pated disruption resulting from the speech at the time it is made rather
than any actual disruption which eventually occurred, expected or not.2 3 9
In a more recent opinion, the Eleventh Circuit framed the balancing
test as a comparison of the employee's First Amendment rights and the
"state's interest in office loyalty," with precedent developing the poli-
cymaker exception as highly persuasive in the outcome. 240 In essence, the
Underwood court argues that Elrod's policymaker calculus should govern
candidacy dismissals.241 However, the right to candidacy, whether it is
viewed as speech on public concern or a separately protected right,
should not merit the same level of constitutional protection as guaranteed
for political affiliation under Elrod.2 4 2 Accepting that candidacy is consti-
tutionally imperative, its real value lies in derivatively fostering the politi-
cal process, a right far more attenuated than a public employee's right to
234. See id.
235. See Jantzen v. Hawkins, 188 F.3d 1247, 1257-58 (10th Cir. 1999); Click v. Cope-
land, 970 F.2d 106, 112 (5th Cir. 1992).
236. See supra text accompanying notes 120-22, 126-30.
237. Randall v. Scott, 610 F.3d 701, 714 (11th Cir. 2010).
238. Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 398-99 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
239. See id.





political affiliation.243 Consequently, precedent developing Elrod is rele-
vant to determining the constitutionality of a candidacy dismissal, but less
weight should be given to the individual's interest in candidacy when ap-
plying the calculus. 244 Thus, flaws exist under both incongruous formula-
tions of the Eleventh Circuit's balancing tests, and refinement is
warranted.
V. CONCLUSION
The lower courts remain divided concerning the constitutional status of
candidacy in the context of dismissals of public employees who announce
their candidacy for public office. The circuits rely heavily on Supreme
Court precedent addressing laws that restrict candidate access to the bal-
lots and reach strikingly contradictory conclusions despite citing identical
language. When scrutinized, the Supreme Court's ballot access cases are
too ambiguous to ascertain the Court's position on the constitutionality
of candidacy dismissals. Nevertheless, candidacy should be protected in
order to derivatively preserve political speech and affiliation that inevita-
bly flow from an individual's candidacy. The First Amendment's primary
purpose is to protect democratic political processes, and it is imperative
that candidacy be protected to safeguard against the erosion of democ-
racy. Even if candidacy itself were not protected under the First Amend-
ment, the act of announcing candidacy should constitute speech touching
on matters of public concern, protected under the First Amendment sub-
ject to Pickering analysis. Failure to recognize protection for candidacy
under the First Amendment, either as a protected right by itself or as a
form of protected expression, would discourage public employees from
running for public office and encourage negative and derogatory attacks
during campaigns. Finally, the Eleventh Circuit, though commendable for
recognizing a right to candidacy, has articulated a flawed balancing ap-
proach which needs to be clarified.
243. See id.; supra text accompanying notes 201-03.
244. See Underwood, 698 F.3d at 1340.
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